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LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND CAPITAL BUDGETING; COMMENT
Stewart C. Myers
This paper is the latest, and I hope the last chapter, in the contro-
versy begun by William H. Baumol and Richard E. Quandt in their criticism [1]
of Weingartner 's work on capital budgeting under capital rationing [5], A
thorough review and partial resolution of the matter has been offered by
Willard T. Carleton in a recent article [2]. My purpose here is to try
to complete the job.
Background
The Weingartner model, reduced to essentials, is as follows;
J T
Maximize c^ ^ [a.j./(l+k) ]xi
j=l t=0 -"
(1)
Subject to [i a,.xj . M,; t = 0, 1,
(2)
x^ J = 1.
where: k = a fixed discount rate, the "cost of capital";
a4(. = the net cash flow, possibly negative, obtained
from project j in period t;
x^ = the number of units of j constructed;
Mj. = the fixed amount of cash available at t.
Weingartner actually makes a distinction between cash outlays and cash
returns. However, the distinction is not necessary within the restricted
scope of this paper.

This follows Carleton's presentation [2], to which the reader is
referred for a full summary of the controversey and for discussion of a
number of side issues not treated here.
The slipperiest issue raised by Baumol and Quandt is that Weingartner 's
model
2
appears to run afoul of the Hirshleifer difficulty : the discount
factors (l+k)~t in solution must equal ratios of the internal
discount factors. Since we acknowledge the existence of
capital rationing, k must itself be internally determined
and hence be independent of monetary phenomena. However,
if we assume that k is a true marginal opportunity rate, then
it turns out that we cannot use present value discounting
in the primal objective function until we know the values of
the dual variables.
3
If the objective function cannot be specified until a solution is found,
then the problem itself does not make sense, as Baumol and Quandt amply
demonostrate.
One possible response to this issue is to argue that capital ration-
ing is not "hard", in the sense of a absolute limit on external finance,
but a tentative restriction posited as an aid to planning and control.
This is the tack taken by Weingartner [6] and, in a more elaborate way,
by Carleton [2] . Both have offered quite plausible interpretations of the
basic model under these circumstances.
But the matter is not yet satisfactorily resolved for the case of
Hirshleifer [3]
^Carleton [2], pp. 826-827,

"hard" rationing -- the case Baumol and Quandt were concerned with.
The Baumol-Quandt Solution
4
Baxunol and Quandt recast the basic model as follows:
T
Maximize *£^
^t^t ^^^
t=0
Subject to ~ [^ ^it^j • ^t - \'> t = 1 2 T
(4)
W^, Xj > 0.
where; W^. = cash withdrawn for owners' consvm^Jtion in period t;
U^ = marginal utility of consun?)tion in t^ assumed constant.
This solves the problem^ but not in a wholly useful way. First, the
objective is a corporate one, and it is not clear that the usual idea of
a project's present value retains meaning. Second, and more in^jortant,
the idea of maximizing "utility," while perhaps useful to the individual
investor, seems both vague and arbitrary for corporate capital budgeting
decisions. As Carleton notes, "Precluded from using the company's cost
of capital, [Baumol and Quandt] invoke a subjective discounting procedure
whose welfare implications for resource allocation are quite suspect."
[ iJ. p. 326,
See Carleton's discussion of this point. [2], p. 829.
^Ibid.

Resolution
For corporate decisions, the resolution of this matter of "hard"
capital rationing is so simple that one can only apologize for having
taken so much space to describe the problem.
We assume a world of certainty, and the absence of market imperfec-
tions except for capital rationing.
First, consider Eq. (4), the constraint in the Baumol-Quandt formula-
tion. This will always be a strict equality in the optimal solution, since
increasing W^ always increases the objective function. Solving for W^^
and substituting in the objective function, Eq, (3), the problem can be
rewritten
T J
Maximize ^ U(-[M^ + ^ ^it^i^ (3a)
t=0 J = '
Subject to
J
Jt J t
-j' \ ^ 0.
= M t = 0, 1,
(4a)
The constant term 2. ^tMt can be dropped from the objective function
without harm.
The differences of Eqs. (3a) and (4a) from (1) and (2) are the inclu-
sion of "slack" variables W and the use of marginal utilities, Ut,
rather than the discount factors l/(l+k)t. The extra slack variables are
It is also an equality because sources and uses of funds have to be
equal. Any "slack" in such an equation can, and should, be interpreted
as another investment project — i.e., investment in cash or liquid
assets.

not in^jortant, but the latter difference appears to be.
In a certain world, however, investors facing a prevailing interest
rate k will all adjust their portfolios so that the following conditions
hold^
"t 1
"t-1 ^^
Ut
(5)
Uo
' (i+k)t <6)
The interest rate k is, of course, the firm's "cost of capital."
We can scale any utility function so that Uq =: 1. At equilibrium,
then, the following relationship will hold for all investors:
M = 1 (6a)
^ (l+k)t
In other words, the firm can use the observed interest rate k to infer
the marginal utilities required by the Baumol-Quandt formulation.
Substituting Eq. (6a) in (4a), the Baumol-Quandt formulation turns
out to be exactly equivalent to the original Weingartner model, Eqs. (1)
and (2).
Conclusion
We may summarize as follows:
1. Weingartner was right in the first place; the "Hirshleifer
Problem" does not apply.
Q
See the Appendix to this paper.

2. Since the problem does not exist, Baumol and Quandt's "solution"
is no different than the original model, as they would have dis-
covered had they pushed their analysis a bit further.
3. The existence of capital rationing should not change the firm's
basic objective. Shareholders' utility is maximized when the
firm's current market value (the present value of future dividends)
is maximized; and the firm's market value is the sum of the
present values of accepted projects.
4. It is not true that "if during period t capital is in short
supply and is effectively limited to the amount M , then
. . .
the firm is thereby necessarily cut off from the capital market
9
and, as a consequence, from any external discounting criteria."
The firm always has the option of paying dividends, and the rela-
tive values of dividend payments at different points in time is
determined by the interest rate k regardless of whether capital
is rationed. The "cost of capital" k thus serves perfectly well
as an external discounting criterion in the case of "hard" capital
rationing.
^Baumol and Quandt [l], p. 322.

APPENDIX
Consider an investor in a world of certainty where security prices are
determined in the usual way:
T R.(t)
P = C -J (A.l)
^ t=0 (l+k)*^
where: P
. (0) = price per unit of security j at the beginning of
period t = 0;
R.(0) = cash return of j in t, except in the (arbitrary)
-" horizon period T, for which R
,
(T) = any cash pay-
ment at T plus P.(T); ^
k = the rate of interest, here assumed independent of t.
The investor's problem is to maximize the utility of his consumption
stream over the period t = 0, 1, ..., T, subject to the constraint that
current wealth, E, be divided between investment and current consumption,
C(0). The corresponding Lagrangian expression is
V = U(C(0), C(l) C(T))
+ dx (P (0)-R (0)) + CCO)-E)
j J J
where: x. = the number of units of security j purchased; for
-" for t = 1, 2, . . . , T
C(t) = endowed income (assumed given) plus ^ x.R. (t)
.
j "
-^
Note that x. can be negative— this represents borrowing or selling short.

Define U =. S^/icix) , the marginal utility of consumption in t. Then
the conditions for the optimum are
77- = ^UR.(t) +.A(P (O)-R.CO)) = , (A. 3)
= u + A= .
<5c(0) o
Since /I = -U^, we have the following result for any security j.
T U
P. CO) = ^ TT R^Ct) (A. 4)
-^ t=0 -•
Moreover, this holds for all investors, since each one faces the same
prices P
.
(0) and has the same (certain) estimates of returns R.(t).
Comparing Equations (A.l) and (A. 4) it is apparent that
Tr =-^ (A.5)
^0 (1+k)'^
The firm can use the interest rate k as a "cost of capital" and be
assured that its investment decisions maximize any shareholders' utility.
This demonstration is of course, simply a compressed statement of the
classical theory of security valuation. See, for example, Hirshleifer [3]
or Myers (4J
.
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